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AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
PROGRAM BUDGETING IN GEORGIA 
 
 
 This brief examines the challenges faced by Georgia in its 
implementation of a Prioritized Program Budgeting 
system, with a particular focus on the development of 
the state’s budgetary program structure.  While there is 
voluminous information about the development and use 
of performance measures, e.g.,(Hatry 1999; Poister & 
Streib 1999; Kittredge & Kissler 1998; Joyce 1999, 2003), 
there are few resources to help guide states through the 
process of building the initial programmatic “platform.”  
This initial step, which was first comprehensively 
implemented in the fiscal year (FY) 2006 budget year, has 
proved more challenging for Georgia than was perhaps 
anticipated.  This report is meant to help the various 
state budget and program officers in Georgia reflect on 
their current transition from line item to program 
budgets as well as to provide a resource for other states 
considering a similar transition.   
to program, and legislative attention shifted from a 
focus on inputs to a focus on agency purposes.  
Previously agencies had been responsible for ensuring 
that they did not transfer more than 2 percent into 
any one object class appropriation (associated with 
personal services, travel, regular operating expenses, 
etc.) without legislative approval.  With the switch to 
program budgeting, the legislature imposed transfer 
controls of 2 percent or $250,000 whichever was less 
on programs in the budget.   
Why a Program Based Performance Oriented 
Budget? 
History in Brief 
Although Georgia has developed program structures at 
other times—most recently after the adoption of the 
1993 Budget and Accountability Act—the 2006 
transition was the most dramatic because for the first 
time the legislature changed its system of budgeting.  The 
legislative transition was important because legal 
accountability  for  budgeting  shifted  from  object  class 
States have been transitioning to performance based 
budgets in an effort to focus resource allocation 
decisions on outcomes or results rather than on 
control over inputs.  The theory behind performance 
based budgeting is that in return for greater 
accountability for results, agency managers will be 
given increased flexibility to manage inputs as 
necessary in order to produce the desired results.  
“Programs” often provide the platform for a 
performance based system because of the intuitive 
idea that that a program is the appropriate budgetary 
unit for assigning managerial flexibility and  
responsibility    for    results.     In    this    formulation 
programs are the level at which agencies enter into a 
“contract” to produce results.   
Programs are also often linked to result measures and overall 
agency goals through a strategic planning process.  In this 
model, programs can be conceptualized as the “strategies” that 
an agency uses to achieve a set of outcomes and ultimately 
overall agency and statewide goals.  The problem is that such 
definitions and guidelines are rarely sufficient—program 
definitions and the associated transfer controls interact with 
existing organizational arrangements, accounting structures, 
demands for evaluation and transparency as well as the 
institutional tug-of-war between the legislature, executive, and 
agencies for strategic control of agency priority-setting.  In 
Georgia, these criteria actually played a far greater role in 
shaping a program structure than strategic planning or the idea 
of a managerial performance contract.   
Difficulties in Implementation 
By all accounts, the state has struggled with implementation of 
its program structure.  The problems include: 
● A lack of clarity about program definitions and the 
process through which the state would transition to 
program budgeting.  Fundamentally, almost no agency 
derived its program as part of a strategic planning 
process.  
● Some of the programs, as defined, may “lack 
integrity”—or it is not entirely clear how different 
activities (and associated expenditures and revenues) 
are assigned to programs.  Although, this report did 
not audit agency programs and thus does not purport 
to verify this problem, there are a number of 
indications from interviews with staff at all levels of 
government that this is likely to be a serious issue.   
● Reduced flexibility for agencies because of a 
combination of stringent transfer controls in the 
appropriations bill, highly differentiated programs, and 
continued restrictions on object class transfers.  From 
an agency perspective, program budgeting just added 
another level of control on top of the previous level 
of control.  
● Conflict between the legislative and executive 
branches over strategic control of agency priorities as 
well as control over federal and other funds.  
 
 
Conflicting Demands on the Program Structure 
In part, the problem of program budgeting requires a careful 
assessment of how programs are going to be used within the 
larger system of resource allocation, managerial decision-
making, and oversight and evaluation.  In this context, the state 
needs to assess when a program should be constrained 
through the transfer controls that enforce legal accountability 
and when a program (or other budget unit) can be simply 
reported, monitored, and/or evaluated.  The state could also 
be more creative about types of transfer controls and systems 
of oversight and evaluation. 
Evaluation Models, Oversight, and Transparency 
Based on the theory of performance based management and 
budgeting, programs should be associated with result measures 
and then evaluated for cost-effective attainment of these 
results.  Informally, staff throughout government can often 
evaluate performance by looking at trends over time, or 
assessing performance measures in relation to performance 
targets or benchmarks.  These sorts of evaluations, however, 
suggest program structure that has clear lines of association 
between activities, funding, and sets of results that can be 
measured in a reasonable time frame.   
However, often truly answering underlying questions about 
program performance requires more formal evaluation.  
Formal evaluations might examine questions of 1) why a 
program has not achieved desired outcomes; 2) program 
efficiency or cost-effectiveness in achieving outcomes; 3) 
comparisons between programs, activities, or sub-programs; 4) 
appropriateness or effectiveness of internal processes, 
activities, or sub-programs; 5) comparisons of regional or 
institutional effectiveness, etc.  For both formal and 
information evaluations, the appropriate units of evaluation are 
likely to be far more disaggregated than exists in Georgia’s 
current program structure and would likely encompass 
subprograms, activities, and object class level information in 
the current program structure. 
Systems of transparency are likely to be similar.  A transparent 
budget system suggests the availability of information about 
agency performance and priorities to those external to 
government.  Being able to see agency allocation of resources 
at a subprogram or even activity level in the current system is 
likely to improve transparency. 
Managerial Considerations 
Running directly counter to an evaluation-oriented program 
structure, a key purpose of program-based performance-
oriented systems is to provide managerial flexibility and 
discretion.  Further, correctly allocating expenditures (and at 
times non-state fund revenues) to programs presents serious 
organizational and technical challenges.  Programs may cut 
across organizational lines requiring cost-allocation procedures 
to sort through costs.  Budget directors and program 
managers have to appropriately project demand for services 
for a particular program as well as potential revenues that 
might be associated with a program.  At times, federal funding 
systems or even state laws and existing state policies have to 
be harmonized with a program budgeting structure (for 
instance, formula grant programs may not align appropriately 
with a program budgeting structure). Accounting systems have 
to be aligned to accommodate a program structure, and 
administrators throughout the organization have to be trained 
to appropriately allocate funds.  Failure to appropriately 
implement these systems can lead to a loss of “program 
integrity.”  For these reasons, a number of agencies would like 
to see a program structure with much larger programs than 
currently exists in Georgia.  
Legislative versus Executive and Agency Control 
Although discussions of budget reforms often try to pretend 
that “politics” does not exist – many reforms have failed 
because they do not recognize and accommodate the natural 
institutional tension between the legislative and executive 
branches of government.  In Georgia, the executive branch 
through the Office of Planning and Budget has a certain 
amount of operational oversight of an agency’s budget—e.g., it 
oversees transfers between object classes, programs and 
subprograms, amendment of federal and other funds and so 
forth.  Thus, the executive does not require the budget 
document to be structured a particular way in order to retain 
power or control over agency activities. 
In Georgia’s current system, the legislature, however, relies on 
the budget document and supporting materials, such as the 
tracking documents, to prioritize and communicate legislative 
intent.  As a result, the legislature will tend to prefer a more 
disaggregated program structure with stricter transfer 
controls, while the executive and agencies tend to prefer 
larger programs with looser transfer controls.  (This dilemma 
is not unique to Georgia.)  As a result, the transition to 
program budgeting has become a tug-of-war between the 
legislature that wants to use control over the program 
structure as an extension of its ability to convey legislative 
intent and the executive and agencies that have to struggle 
with the managerial and technical problems associated with 
defining program structures.  The executive and agencies, 
however, also express concern about the loss of strategic 
control (or power) to the legislature as a result of program 
budgeting.  
Analysis and Considerations 
A number of tensions have been brought to bear on the 
program structure in Georgia’s budget.  At the most basic 
level, the programs need to be reviewed to clarify how 
activities and associated expenditures and revenues are 
assigned to different programs and to align programs with a 
strategic plan.  However, Georgia also needs to consider the 
larger framework in which the program structure is being 
implemented:  this includes an assessment of how programs are 
going to be used as well as an effort to better reconcile the 
competing political, managerial, evaluation oriented, and 
technical pressures.  
Some Alternatives: 
Adjust the transfer controls:  Much of the current tension 
associated with program budgeting is result of the transfer 
controls.  Transfer controls in the appropriations bill typically 
have the benefit of ensuring accuracy in accounting for 
expenditures at the program level; and are a source of 
legislative control over funding.  Transfer controls over object 
classes are used by the executive to monitor agency 
operations and are a source of executive control over agency 
activities.   
These controls, however, are not fixed, nor are the processes 
through which transfers are monitored.  The legislature could 
adjust transfer controls associated with programs to focus on 
programs where there is a particular concern about control 
and relax the controls where the legislature trusts the agency 
to manage the funds in accordance with legislative intent.  The 
legislature could move between different groupings of 
programs based on these concerns.  Such shifts though would 
have to be tempered by agency ability to accurately account 
for funds at different program levels.   
Adjust the process of oversight:  Rather than adjusting the 
transfer controls, the legislature and executive could 
streamline the process of oversight for transfers.  For instance, 
the legislature could allow legislative staff to sign off on 
transfers rather than referring decisions to the full Fiscal 
Affairs Committee.  Alternatively, the Fiscal Affairs Committee 
could meet more regularly.  Or the state could develop 
systems where the legislature is notified and transfers are 
considered approved unless the legislative staff or selected 
legislators request additional information or protest the 
transfer within a certain period of time.  There are a number 
of variations.   
Similarly, OPB could adjust the monitoring of transfer controls 
over object classes to ensure that some transfers are only 
monitored while others require explicit approval.   
Switch from ex ante control to ex post control:  Currently, Georgia 
is relying heavily on ex ante (or up front) control over agency 
spending rather than ex post (or after the fact) control.  Ex 
post systems, which are the premise of performance based 
budgeting, rely more heavily on evaluation and remedial action 
for poor performance rather than controls over spending up 
front, particularly by the legislature.  Virginia provides a good 
example of such a system. 
In an ex post system of control, Georgia might have a well 
defined and disaggregated program structure in the 
appropriations bill, but the executive branch and agencies 
would be given extensive authority to transfer funds as long as 
it was in keeping with legislative e intent.  Programs would also 
be associated with key performance measures that were 
important to legislators, the executive, and the public at large.  
At the end of the fiscal year, the legislature would commission 
evaluations to assess a host of implementation questions, 
including whether agency decisions are in keeping with 
legislative intent.  In such a system, expectations would be set 
beforehand through the budget process; however, agencies 
would have significant flexibility to adapt.  Control would be 
exerted through evaluation and potential legislative remedial 
action if performance was poor or legislative intent was 
ignored.  Georgia has elements of such a system in place; 
however, the state would likely have to invest in a greater 
legislative capacity to evaluate and would have to develop 
performance measures with legislative input. 
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